White House Commission on
Aviation Safety and Security
FINAL REPORT
TO
PRESIDENT CLINTON
VICE PRESIDENT AL GORE, CHAIRMAN
FEBRUARY 12, 1997
February 12, 1997
President William J. Clinton
The White House
Washington, DC
Dear Mr. President,
We are pleased to present you with the report of the White House Commission
on Aviation Safety and Security. You established this Commission by issuing
Executive Order 13015 on August 22, 1996 with a charter to study matters
involving aviation safety and security, including air traffic control and to
develop a strategy to improve aviation safety and security, both domestically
and internationally.
During the past six months, we have conducted an intensive inquiry into civil
aviation safety, security and air traffic control modernization. Commission and
staff have gathered information from a broad range of aviation specialists,
Federal Agencies, consumer groups, and industry leaders.
After many months of deliberations we have agreed on a set of recommendations
which we believe will serve to enhance and ensure the continued safety and
security of our air transportation system.
We are privileged to submit these recommendations herewith.
Sincerely,
Vice President Al Gore, Chairman
In compliance with the Executive Order 13015 of August 22, 1996,
the undersigned present the report of the White House Commission on Aviation
Safety and Security.
Vice President Al Gore, Chairman
James A. Abrahamson Brian Michael Jenkins
Jesse Lee Beauchamp Raymond W. Kelly
Franklin R. Chang-Diaz John Michael Loh
Antonia Handler Chayes Bradford W. Parkinson
William T. Coleman, Jr. Federico Peņa
Victoria Cummock Franklin D. Raines
John M. Deutch Patrick A. Shea
Kathleen Flynn Laura D'Andrea Tyson
Louis J. Freeh Carl W. Vogt
James E. Hall George H. Williams
Editor's Note:
l. The final two sentences of the first paragraph of Recommendation 4.4 have
been changed to reflect the precise nature of the agreement by U.S. airlines.
2. The typed version of the final report inadvertently omitted manufacturers
from the list of those to whom the Commission expressed appreciation. That
mistake has been corrected in this edition.
3. In this edition, typographical errors have been silently corrected.
4. This edition contains as Appendix I a dissent by Commissioner Cummock
which was transmitted to the Commission one week after the report was voted on
in public session and presented to President Clinton.
During the public session, Commissioner Cummock dissented from three
recommendations. The dissent published in this document goes far beyond those
registered in public. It presents for the first time material and arguments the
other Commissioners did not have an opportunity to consider. However, many of
the arguments made in the dissent were considered and rejected by the other
members of the Commission.
Supplemental material included in Commissioner Cummock's dissent is available
upon request to Richard K. Pemberton, Office of the Secretary of Transportation,
U.S. Department of Transportation.
Introduction
Change.
That one word sums up both the challenges in aviation safety and security,
and the means by which government and industry must respond. Change is nothing
new in this field. The first powered flight, covering 120 feet in twelve
seconds, took place just over ninety years ago. Today, planes cross the Atlantic
Ocean in a matter of hours, as hundreds of passengers watch movies and dine. An
industry that essentially did not even exist before World War I now occupies a
central position in our economy. Today, commercial aviation generates over $300
billion annually, and accounts for close to one million American jobs.
The changes taking place in aviation today are as profound as any this
industry has seen before. Since 1992, sixty new airlines have started service,
opening up new markets, attracting new passengers, and impacting the economics
of the industry significantly. The number of passengers flying in the United
States over the last decade has grown to more than half a billion. The FAA has
certified twenty new aircraft models in the last ten years, and plans are under
consideration for a new High-Speed Civil Transport.
As dramatic as these changes have been, even more significant change looms on
the horizon. Information technology presents opportunities that will again
revolutionize the industry, in ways as significant as the introduction of the
jet engine forty years ago. Air traffic today is still controlled through
ground-based radar, and on a point-to-point basis. Satellite-based navigation
will bring a fundamental change in the way that air traffic is directed, and may
make the notion of "highway lanes in the sky" as obsolete as the
bonfires that used to guide early fliers. Digital technology will replace analog
systems, making communications with and among aircraft dramatically faster, more
efficient, and effective. These and other new technologies offer tremendous
opportunities for improved safety, security and efficiency, and will transform
aviation in the same way that the Internet and World Wide Web are transforming
the way the world does business.
Other changes are even more imminent. By the end of the century, the
commercial fleet serving the United States will have been completely overhauled,
with aircraft that make a fraction of the old noise and emit far less pollution.
Continuing success in the United States' efforts to open up foreign markets to
competition by our airlines likely will mean more airlines, serving more
markets, carrying more people. A continuation of the trend toward greater
competition and lower fares will make flying even more available to average
Americans than it is today. In fact, the FAA projects that, in 2007, more than
800 million passengers will fly in the United States --- three times the number
who flew in 1980.
This is a time of change for government, as well. President Clinton's
declaration that "the era of big government is over," coalesced a
bipartisan drive to make government work better and cost less. The
Administration's commitment to government reform resulted not just from a desire
to bring down government spending, but from a recognition that the same types of
changes facing industries such as aviation face government, as well. Like the
private sector, government must change with the times. The question is, how?
Establishment of the Commission on Aviation Safety and Security
President Clinton created the White House Commission on Aviation Safety and
Security to address that question, and assigned it three specific mandates: to
look at the changing security threat, and how we can address it; to examine
changes in the aviation industry, and how government should adapt its regulation
of it; to look at the technological changes coming to air traffic control, and
what should be done to take best advantage of them. In the wake of concerns over
the crash of Trans World Airlines Flight 800, President Clinton asked the
Commission to focus its attention first on the issue of security. He asked for
an initial report on aviation security in 45 days, including an action plan to
deploy new high technology machines to detect the most sophisticated explosives.
On September 9, 1996, the Commission presented that initial
report to the President. It contained twenty recommendations for enhancing
aviation security which are presented again in Chapter 3 of this report. The
response to the initial report was unprecedented. In October 1996, at the
request of President Clinton, the Congress appropriated over $400 million, in
direct accord with the Commission's recommendations, for the acquisition of new
explosives detection technology and other security enhancements. In the five
months since they were presented, implementation has begun on virtually all of
the initial recommendations.
From its inception, the Commission took a hands-on approach to its work.
President Clinton announced the formation of the Commission on July
25, 1996. A few days later, Vice President Gore led a site visit to Dulles
International Airport, where he and other Commissioners saw airport and airline
operations first-hand, and discussed issues with front line workers. This was
the first of dozens of such visits. Over the next six months, the Commission
visited facilities throughout the United States and in various locations abroad.
Seeking to reach the broadest possible audience, the Commission established a
homepage on the Internet (http://www.aviationcommission.dot.gov
-- since taken down by the current administration),
both to make the Commission's work available and to receive input. The web site
has had almost 7,000 contacts, many providing valuable insights. The Commission
held six public meetings, hearing from over fifty witnesses representing
a cross section of the aviation industry and the public, including families of
victims of air disasters. Recognizing the increasingly global nature of
aviation, the Commission co-sponsored an International Conference on Aviation
Safety and Security with the George Washington University, attended by over 700
representatives from sixty-one countries.
Out of this extensive process, the Commission compiled the recommendations
presented in this final report.
A Vision for the Future
To compete in the global economy of the 21st Century, America needs a
healthy, vibrant aviation industry. In turn, the health and vibrancy of aviation
depend on improved levels of safety, security and modernization. For the last
fifty years, the United States has led the field of aviation. But, that position
is being challenged, both by competition from abroad and by weaknesses in our
own systems.
These weaknesses can be overcome. The Commission believes that it should be a
national priority to do so. This report outlines steps that can set government
and industry on a course to achieve that goal together. Heading into the next
century, our activities, programs, and results should define aviation safety and
security for the rest of the world.
Leadership in aviation goes far beyond having strong, competitive airlines.
It means assuring leadership in communications, satellite, aerospace, and other
technologies that increasingly are defining the global economy. It means more
than the highest possible levels of safety and security for travelers.
The Commission's report reflects a focus on this vision: to ensure greater
safety and security for passengers; to restructure the relationships between
government and industry into partnerships for progress; and to maintain global
leadership in the aviation industry.
Key Recommendations
In the area of safety, the Commission believes that the principal focus
should be on reducing the rate of accidents by a factor of five within a decade,
and recommends a re-engineering of the FAA's regulatory and certification
programs to achieve that goal.
In the area of air traffic control, the Commission believes that the safety
and efficiency improvements that will come with a modernized system should not
be delayed, and recommends that the program be accelerated for to achieve full
operational capability by the year 2005. In addition, a more effective system
must be established to finance modernization of the National Airspace System and
enhancements in safety and security.
In the area of security, the Commission believes that the threat against
civil aviation is changing and growing, and that the federal government must
lead the fight against it. The Commission recommends that the federal government
commit greater resources to improving aviation security, and work more
cooperatively with the private sector and local authorities in carrying out
security responsibilities.
Although not specifically directed to do so, the Commission also took up the
issue of responding to aviation disasters. In this area, the Commission believes
that a better coordinated and more compassionate response is necessary, and that
the responsibility for coordinating the response needs to be placed with a
single entity. The Commission is pleased with the progress made to date in this
area, including the designation of the National Transportation Safety Board as
that single entity.
Many of the Commission's recommendations apply equally to each of the three
major areas of focus, including those relating to regulation and certification.
Primary among these recommendations is the call for greater use of partnerships
in meeting goals. Regulatory and enforcement agencies such as the Customs
Service, the Occupational Safety and Health Administration, and the Food and
Drug Administration have put new emphasis on partnerships with industries, and
are achieving tremendous results: seizing more drugs while expediting travel for
legitimate travelers; reducing workplace accidents while increasing
productivity; and getting important new AIDS and cancer-fighting drugs to market
in a fraction of the time it used to take.
The premise behind these partnerships is that government can set goals, and
then work with industry in the most effective way to achieve them. Partnership
does not mean that government gives up its authorities or responsibilities. Not
all industry members are willing to be partners. In those cases, government must
use its full authority to enforce the law. But, through partnerships, government
works with industry to find better ways to achieve its goals, seeking to replace
confrontation with cooperation. Such partnerships hold tremendous promise for
improving aviation safety and security. A shift away from prescriptive
regulations will allow companies to take advantage of incentives and reach goals
more quickly.
Transportation Secretary Peņa's cooperative program with airlines to
establish a single level of safety is an example of innovative
government-industry partnership. Another is Vice President Gore's January 15,
1997 announcement that Boeing, in concert with government agencies, had
developed a plan to modify the rudders on hundreds of its 737 aircraft. By
acting without waiting for a government mandate, Boeing will complete many of
these safety-enhancing modifications before the government could complete a rule
requiring the action.
Partnership must extend not only to regulated entities, but also to the
various federal agencies involved with aviation safety and security. A number of
agencies outside the Department of Transportation have expertise and resources
that can have a direct impact on improving safety and security. The Commission
urges the Administration to continue to work to expand and improve these
intergovernmental relationships.
In the last few years, the FAA has begun to recognize and respond to the
tremendous changes it faces. Reviews such as the Challenge 2000 report examined
ways of improving the way the FAA regulates operators and manufacturers. Now is
the time for the FAA to build on that work, and aggressively reengineer itself
to adapt to the demands of the 21st Century.
It is important to note that the FAA, alone among federal agencies, has been
given some critical new tools to help shape its own future. A new Management
Advisory Council will provide valuable input to the agency's decision-making
process. In 1995, the Congress granted the Clinton Administration's request for
unprecedented reforms of the FAA's personnel and procurement systems. These
reforms give the FAA almost unlimited latitude to design new systems to meet the
agency's unique and particular needs. The first phases of these reforms were
implemented in April 1996, and are already producing dividends. The FAA used to
have 233 procurement documents, and today there are less than 50. Using its
streamlined process, the FAA recently completed a billion dollar procurement in
six months, with no protests. Under the old system, it would have taken three
times as long, and likely would have been delayed by costly protests. A stack of
personnel rules that used to be one-foot high has been reduced to 41 pages, and
will allow the agency to hire people where they're needed and when they're
needed.
This flexibility will be critical to meeting the challenges of the next
century. As former FAA Administrator David Hinson recently noted, this type of
reform is "the seed for what needs to happen at the FAA." The incoming
leadership at the Department of Transportation and the FAA must utilize fully
the flexibilities that have been granted if the agency is to keep pace with the
rapidly changing industry it regulates.
Responsibility for Implementing Change
The Commission's goal for aviation in the next century may be summed up by
the words of Robert Crandall, Chairman of American Airlines, when he said,
"We would like the public to take safety and security as a given. If that
is going to happen, change is necessary."
The responsibility for achieving that change lies with all the partners in
aviation. The Administration, the Congress, the entire aviation industry and its
employees must work together to make the changes that are necessary to keep pace
with the challenges facing them. Commitments must be made at the highest levels
of every organization, in government and in the private sector.
To ensure that the government remains focused on the goals established in
this report, the Commission recommends three steps:
(1) that the Secretary of Transportation report publicly each year on the
implementation status of these recommendations;
(2) that the President assign the incoming leadership at the Department of
Transportation and the FAA the clear mission of leading their agencies through
the necessary transition to re-engineered safety and security programs; and
(3) that the performance agreements for these positions, which the documents
that senior managers sign with the President outlining their goals and specific
means of measuring progress, include implementation of these recommendations.
Chapter One:
Improving Aviation Safety
"The FAA, despite its professionalism and many accomplishments, was
simply never created to deal with the environment that has been produced by
deregulation of the air transport industry."
Stuart Matthews, President and CEO, Flight Safety Foundation.
Commercial aviation is the safest mode of transportation. That record has
been established not just through government regulation, but through the work of
everyone involved in aviation -- manufacturers, airlines, airport operators, and
a highly-skilled and dedicated workforce. Their combined efforts have produced a
fatal accident rate of 0.3 per million departures in the United States. The
accident rate for commercial aviation declined dramatically between 1950 and
1970. But, over the last two decades, that rate has remained low, but flat.
Heading into the next century, the overall goal of aviation safety programs is
clear: to bring that rate down even lower.
Focusing on the accident rate is critical because of the projected increases
in traffic. Unless that rate is reduced, the actual number of accidents will
grow as traffic increases. Given the international nature of aviation, cutting
the accident rate is an imperative not just for the United States, but for all
countries involved in aviation. Accident rates in some areas of the world exceed
those in the U.S. by a factor of ten or more. Boeing projects that unless the
global accident rate is reduced, by the year 2015, an airliner will crash
somewhere in the world almost weekly.
While fatality rates in general aviation are higher than in commercial
operations, the principal causes of general aviation accidents are similar to
commercial aviation accidents. The Commission's recommendations will help
address the safety of general aviation as well.
Lessons from reinventing government must be applied to aviation programs.
Improvements in safety and security will result from a focus on several key
areas: expanded use of partnerships; reengineering of the FAA's regulatory and
certification processes; greater focus on human factors and training; and, the
faster introduction of proven new technologies. These technologies are enabling
the introduction of increasingly sophisticated automation into virtually every
aspect of aviation operations. They offer opportunities for improved safety,
security, and efficiency, and are driving the aviation industry toward an
integrated system that will alter many of the things that have remained
unchanged in aviation for decades.
Adapting to these changes will require renewed commitments from all partners,
and a willingness to re-engineer long-standing practices and procedures. This
change also calls for a cultural transformation of the FAA to improve its
ability to regulate and lead the development of the integrated aviation system
on the horizon. In the areas of regulation and certification, the Challenge 2000
report represents a good first step. However, it and other internal reviews have
not provided a comprehensive, agency-wide assessment of the need for change.
That is what is needed.
A strong government-industry partnership is needed to develop and integrate
the research, standards, regulations, procedures, and infrastructure needed to
support the aviation system of the future. The FAA has applied this approach
successfully to cooperative research projects with NASA in the development of
advanced air traffic technologies. The Commission encourages these agencies and
others to expand their cooperative efforts in aviation safety research and
development.
Regular and random inspection of airlines and facilities should remain an
important part of the FAA's safety and security oversight programs. However,
given the tremendous growth and globalization in the industry, it is neither
realistic nor desirable to expect the FAA to rely on hands-on inspections to
ensure safety. It is critical that industry be given the incentives and
flexibility to be full partners in this effort, and be encouraged to monitor and
improve their own performance. This will not only produce better focus on
results, but will also allow the FAA to deploy its resources more effectively.
Recommendations
1.1 Government and industry should establish a national goal to reduce
the aviation fatal accident rate by a factor of five within ten years and
conduct safety research to support that goal.
Historically, major advances in aviation safety have been driven by
technological improvements in airframes, engines, communications, radar and
other areas. Today, information technology can help aviation make the next leap
forward in safety.
Aviation safety experts at the FAA and at NASA are confident that a five-fold
reduction in the fatal accident rate could be achieved in the next decade given
the right resources and focus. The Commission urges the FAA, NASA and industry
to step up to this challenge. Achieving this goal will require the combined
efforts of government and industry focused on three objectives: preventing
equipment malfunctions; reducing human-caused mishaps; and ensuring separation
between aircraft and other air or ground hazards. Government can play a strong
role in research and development, but it must be in partnership with industry,
which ultimately is responsible for operating safely. The Commission urges NASA,
which has considerable expertise and resources in the area of safety research,
to expand its involvement in the promotion of aviation safety.
1.2. The FAA should develop standards for continuous safety
improvement, and should target its regulatory resources based on performance
against those standards.
The FAA should promote aviation safety and security by setting high
standards, requiring aviation businesses to monitor and improve their own safety
performance, and by developing objective methods of measuring the ability of
companies to monitor and improve its own safety. Significant efforts have
already been made in this direction. Current regulations, for example, require
commercial air carriers to implement a Continuing Analysis and Surveillance
Program to evaluate the effectiveness of their maintenance and inspection
processes. Significant investment and effort have been put into developing the
Safety Performance Analysis System, which will allow safety inspectors to
compare the performance of similar operators to identify trends that could lead
to reduced levels of safety. Such approaches to aviation safety oversight should
be broadened. Operators should be encouraged to implement systems that ensure
their continued compliance with regulations and that promote continuous
improvements in aviation safety and security.
Last year, the FAA undertook an independent review of its regulatory and
certification programs. That effort, known as Challenge 2000, recommended in
part that the agency move toward implementing rules that establish performance
standards where possible, and that the rulemaking process be streamlined and
reengineered. Further, the report urged that the regulatory process be
restructured to provide compelling technical and business incentives for
industry to develop and certify products that help fulfill priority safety
needs.
The Commission recognizes the value of the Challenge 2000 report, and urges
the FAA and industry to work together to develop standards for continuous safety
and security improvement that recognize variations in company maturity and best
industry practices. These standards should serve as the basis for certification,
regulation and oversight of the aviation industry. Objective criteria should be
developed that enable the FAA to assess each organization's safety improvement
processes and performance, and use this assessment to improve performance
throughout the industry. As an incentive to implement effective safety and
security improvement programs, FAA oversight should be adjusted to recognize the
maturity and actual performance of individual operators and manufacturers. Such
an approach will allow the FAA to target its inspector resources on those
operators demonstrating the greatest risk, while allowing mature operators and
manufacturers to manage their organizations without unproductive FAA
involvement. The FAA should adjust its internal classifications and rankings of
inspectors to reflect this change.
1.3 The DOT and the FAA should be more vigorous in the application of
high standards for certification of aviation businesses.
In the past, both the FAA and the DOT have devoted significant resources to
helping new companies meet regulatory requirements and manage their operations.
The recent 90 Day Safety Review conducted by the DOT and the FAA determined that
this is an inappropriate role for the government and recommended many actions
that will improve the certification process. The Commission agrees. While the
government should assist companies in improving the safety and security of their
operations, it should not use its resources to compensate for lack of
experience, technical expertise or judgment in a company's day-to-day
operations.
In some cases, the FAA's certification standards and processes have not kept
up with the changing needs of civil aviation. For example, current standards for
hiring security personnel do not take into account changes in explosives
detection technology. And the certification of engines and airframes still
reflects a time when these systems were produced as completely independent
systems. Today, engine and airframe development is integrated, so the
certification process must take into account the entire system rather than its
individual parts. In the future, as the airplane becomes an integral component
of the air traffic management system, the certification of the aircraft, as part
of an integrated aviation system, will become even more important.
The FAA demonstrated its ability to integrate these processes and work
effectively with industry in the certification of the Boeing 777 airplane.
Lessons from the 777 certification should be applied to the way the FAA
certificates airplanes in the future. Additional certification tools and
processes should be developed to encourage the introduction of new technologies.
Considerable attention has been given to the issue of outsourcing of
maintenance and other work, particularly in the wake of the Valujet crash. The
Commission does not believe that outsourcing, in and of itself, presents a
problem -- if it is performed by qualified companies and individuals. The proper
focus of concern should be on the FAA's certification and oversight of any and
all companies performing aviation safety functions, including repair stations
certificated by the FAA but located outside of the United States,.
1.4. The Federal Aviation Regulations (FARs) should be simplified and,
as appropriate, rewritten as plain English, performance-based regulations.
The Commission believes that government can achieve better regulatory
compliance if its objectives are stated clearly and its focus is on goals, not
process. While that sounds simple, the FAA's rules too often do not meet those
criteria.
The Commission urges the FAA to take two steps to address this problem.
First, as appropriate, all new rules should be rewritten as performance-based
regulations, and in plain English. Second, within 18 months, a bottom-up review
of existing regulations should be conducted to identify those in need of
rewriting as performance-based, plain English regulations. Such clarifications
would improve compliance and help the FAA resolve serious problems created by
differences in interpretation of regulations by FAA officials across the
country.
The current FARs and supporting Handbooks, Technical Standards Orders,
Security Directives, and Advisory Circulars have become too prescriptive and
complex and are increasingly open to misinterpretation. Sometimes they provide
conflicting policy or procedural guidance. They often stifle the creativity of
those who would do more than the rules require. In many cases, the FARs do not
allow for advances in technology that increase security, safety or efficiency.
For example, the FARs currently have no provisions for design criteria to
protect aircraft from high intensity electromagnetic fields such as those
emanating from TV antennas, radars, cellular phones, portable stereos, and
laptop computers. These electromagnetic fields are potentially hazardous to
aircraft using digital communications, avionics and flight controls. The FAA has
been working for more than eight years to develop standard certification
requirements to address these hazards, but today each certification is handled
through the use of special conditions. Mandating performance rather than
dictating procedures will break the regulatory logjam.
1.5. Cost alone should not become dispositive in deciding aviation
safety and security rulemaking issues.
As noted earlier, the rate of fatal accidents in commercial aviation in the
U.S. is less than 0.3 per million departures. The rarity of accidents can make
it difficult to justify safety and security improvements under benefit cost
criteria applied to regulatory activities. Nevertheless, benefit cost analysis
can enlighten the regulatory decision making process. For example, such analysis
can help identify the most cost effective way to achieve a safety or security
objective. Cost considerations and mathematical formulas, however, should never
be dispositive in making policy determinations regarding aviation safety they
are one input for decision making. Further, non-quantifiable safety and security
benefits should be included in the analysis of proposals.
1.6. Government and industry aviation safety research should emphasize
human factors and training.
Over the past ten years, flight crew error accounted for over 60% of all
aviation accidents world-wide. And over the past five years, two types of flight
crew error, loss of control in flight and controlled flight into terrain,
accounted for over 70% of all airline fatalities. Moreover, recent airport
testing of explosive detection systems revealed significant deficiencies in the
performance of security personnel. Research, technology, training and sharing of
safety data can reduce human error. Aviation safety and security have always
depended upon a talented and dedicated workforce. Today, changes in technology
are presenting that workforce -- flight crews, ground and air traffic
controllers, maintenance technicians -- with new challenges. The aviation system
will continue to rely on these highly skilled people to be responsible for all
aspects of operations, and it is critical to assess and address issues relating
to human interaction with changing technologies.
The FAA, NASA, the DoD, and the aviation industry jointly developed a
National Aviation Human Factors Plan that describes a strategic approach to
solving the problem of human-caused mishaps. Two additional studies, one by the
FAA dealing with flight deck human factors and the other published by
representatives from government, industry, and union organizations as their 1997
Aviation Safety Plan, identify a wide range of safety issues, including human
factors. The Commission acknowledges the importance of all three of these
reports and urges the immediate development of an implementation plan.
1.7. Enhanced ground proximity warning systems should be installed in
all commercial and military passenger aircraft.
The introduction of ground proximity warning systems (GPWS) in commercial
aircraft in the late-1970s led to significant reductions in controlled flight
into terrain, the second-leading cause of aviation accidents. These accidents
occur when pilots cannot reconcile their positions with changing terrain.
Current GPWS systems are not predictive, however, and only warn pilots when
ground impact is imminent. Several recent incidents indicate the need for a
forward-looking system that can provide better situational awareness and
advanced warning to pilots when they are approaching hazardous terrain. Digital
terrain elevation data developed for military purposes can help provide this
capability.
On January 15, 1997, Vice President Gore announced that the Department of
Defense is releasing a version of its global digital terrain elevation database
for use in the civilian sector. Combined with advanced navigation systems, this
will provide pilots with the tools that they need to reduce, and maybe even
eliminate, these kinds of accidents in the future.
The Commission applauds the voluntary introduction of advanced ground
proximity warning systems in commercial aircraft, and urges all segments of the
aviation community to install this vital safety system. To achieve this goal,
the Commission urges the FAA to work with industry to develop and promote the
use of such equipment in general aviation aircraft.
1.8. The FAA should work with the aviation community to develop and
protect the integrity of standard safety databases that can be shared in
accident prevention programs.
The identification of deviations from normal operations, adverse trends, and
other incidents can be a valuable tool in preventing accidents. The most
effective way to identify incidents and problems in aviation is for the people
who operate in the system (pilots, mechanics, controllers, dispatchers, etc.) to
self-disclose the information. There are a number of separate safety data
collection efforts ongoing within government and industry. Many of these efforts
either duplicate existing data, report the same information, or are not
interconnected or integrated. The FAA should work with the aviation community to
develop standard databases of safety information that can be shared openly and
encompass operations within the aviation industry as well as those within the
FAA, such as air traffic control.
People and companies will not provide or assemble safety data or information
if the information will disclose trade secrets, if it can threaten a person's
job or be used in an enforcement action against a person or company, or if it
can in any way cause them a liability. Data protection is the key to
self-disclosure. The Flight Safety Foundation has studied this issue and
concluded that legislation is the only way to guarantee protection of safety
data. The joint industry/DOT Aviation Safety Plan cites data protection as a key
to achieving Zero Accidents. The Congress, at the request of the Administration,
recently enacted legislation providing for the protection from public disclosure
of certain safety and security data voluntarily provided to the FAA. The FAA
needs to expeditiously complete its rulemaking to implement this legislation.
Since adequate legislative protection is key to building the trust necessary for
self disclosure and safety monitoring, the FAA should assess the adequacy of the
new legislative authority and implementing regulations one year after the
regulations take effect. Any necessary regulatory or legislative modifications
identified at that time should be promptly addressed.
1.9. In cooperation with airlines and manufacturers, the FAA's Aging
Aircraft program should be expanded to cover non-structural systems.
The average age of commercial airline fleets is continuing to increase. In
1975, few large commercial aircraft were in service beyond their original design
life, typically twenty years. But with increased competition and growth in
passenger and cargo traffic brought on by deregulation, service lives of
dependable aircraft models were extended through expanded maintenance and
overhaul programs. By the year 2000, more than 2,500 commercial aircraft in the
United States may be flying beyond their original design life.
In 1988, a Boeing 737 in Hawaii suffered severe structural failure of its
forward fuselage sections due to corrosion not visible during normal maintenance
inspections. As a direct result of this accident, the FAA greatly expanded its
structural integrity inspection program and formed the Airworthiness Assurance
Working Group (AAWG). Its focus has been almost exclusively on structural
integrity, and the effects of structural corrosion and fatigue. The programs in
existence under the AAWG have been effective and are considered adequate to deal
proactively with the structural problems associated with aging commercial
aircraft.
However, much less is known about the potential effects of age on
non-structural components of commercial aircraft. Non-structural components
include electrical wiring; connectors, wiring harnesses, and cables; fuel,
hydraulic and pneumatic lines; and electro-mechanical systems such as pumps,
sensors, and actuators. Neither the manufacturers nor the commercial airlines
consider the aging of non-structural components to pose serious safety problems
primarily because they consider their redundancy, replacement upon failure, and
periodic, programmed maintenance to be sufficient to assure aircraft safety.
The Commission is concerned that existing procedures, directives, quality
assurance, and inspections may not be sufficient to prevent safety related
problems caused by the corrosive and deteriorating effects of non-structural
components of commercial aircraft as they age. To address this, the Commission
recommends that the FAA work with airlines and manufacturers to expand the aging
aircraft program to include non-structural components, through steps including:
full and complete tear-downs of selected aircraft scheduled to go out of
service; the establishment of a lead-the-fleet research program; an expansion of
the FAA-DoD-NASA cooperative aging aircraft program; an expansion of programs of
the Airworthiness Assurance Working Group to include non-structural components;
and encouraging the development of modern technical means to ensure and predict
the continued airworthiness of aging non-structural components and systems.
1.10. The FAA should develop better quantitative models
and analytic techniques to inform management decision-making.
The FAA is called upon to evaluate many proposals for safety and security
improvements and capacity enhancements as part of its NAS modernization, and
other programs. The FAA does not have a developed model for the air traffic
control system that permits the systematic evaluation and comparison of these
proposals with respect to their life-cycle cost and their likely effects on the
operation of the air traffic control system. If available, such analysis would
be of great assistance to support decision-making by the FAA and the DOT
leadership.
The Commission urges the FAA to strengthen its analytic and planning tools,
especially through the development of models that give insight into the
system-wide consequences of alternative courses of action and the development of
a credible cost accounting system, as mandated in the Federal Aviation
Reauthorization Act of 1996.
1.11. The DOT should work with the Department of Justice to ensure that
airline crew members performing their duties are protected from passenger
misconduct.
Passenger behavior that amounts to criminal conduct is a matter of growing
concern to U.S. airlines. When crew members are called upon to enforce in-flight
safety and security rules and regulations, they are working to ensure that our
aviation system remains safe and secure. Their responsibilities at times require
them to confront passengers who are unwilling to comply with lawful instructions
and become abusive. Such conduct by passengers threatens the well-being of all
those on the plane, and is subject to federal prosecution. The Commission urges
the DOT to work with the Department of Justice and the United States Attorneys
to ensure that priority is given the prosecution of offending passengers to the
fullest extent of the law for interfering with airline crew members in the
performance of their duties.
1.12. Legislation should be enacted to protect aviation industry
employees who report safety or security violations.
In a number of important industries, statutory protection is provided to
"whistleblowers" who report violations of safety procedures. The
Commission believes that aviation safety and security will be enhanced if
employees, who are a critical link in safety and security, are able to report
unsafe conditions to the FAA without fear of retribution from their employers.
Some aviation employees are provided protections through contractual agreements.
However, the Commission believes that statutory protection, such as that
provided to workers under the Occupational Health and Safety Act, would provide
uniformity within the industry and provide coverage to those not already
protected.
1.13. The FAA should eliminate the exemptions in the Federal Aviation
Regulations that allow passengers under the age of two to travel without the
benefit of FAA-approved restraints.
Current regulations require that all passengers over the age of two have
their own seats, and that those seats are equipped with FAA-approved restraints.
The Commission believes that it is inappropriate for infants to be afforded a
lesser degree of protection than older passengers. The FAA should revise its
regulations to require that all occupants be restrained during takeoff, landing,
and turbulent conditions, and that all infants and small children below the
weight of 40 pounds and under the height of 40 inches be restrained in an
appropriate child restraint system, such as child safety seats, appropriate to
their height and weight. The Commission also notes and commends the FAA's
ongoing efforts in collaboration with major airframe and seat manufacturers to
develop standards for integrated child safety seats.
1.14. The Commission commends the joint government-industry initiative
to equip the cargo holds of all passenger aircraft with smoke detectors, and
urges expeditious implementation of the rules and other steps necessary to
achieve the goal of both detection and suppression in all cargo holds.
In December 1996, most of the nation's major airlines announced a voluntary
action to install smoke detection systems in the cargo holds of commercial
airplanes and to study additional measures for fire suppression. This
announcement broke a deadlock that had existed for most of the last decade. The
Commission commends this initiative as an example of the partnership that will
be necessary to enhance safety and security.
Chapter Two:
Making Air Traffic Control
Safer and More Efficient
"While the airlines are posting record traffic figures and profits,
the ground-based air traffic control infrastructure is outdated and
unable to keep pace with expansion."
Barry Krasner, President of the National Air Traffic Controllers
Association
It is essential that the air traffic system of the United States be
modernized. Although the current system remains safe, it is showing signs of
aging. System outages, brownouts, inefficiencies in air traffic control, and
capacity limitations on the ground add costs to the FAA and to users of the
airspace system. The Air Transport Association estimates that inefficiencies in
the system cost airlines in excess of $3 billion in 1995 -- costs ultimately
paid by passengers and anyone who purchases goods shipped by air.
In 1996, a government-industry task force defined a future operational
concept known as Free Flight. Under this concept, national airspace system (NAS)
operations will transition from ground-based air traffic control (using
analog radios, navigational beacons and radar) to more collaborative air traffic
management based on digital communication, satellite navigation, and
computer-aided decision support tools for controllers and pilots. This proposed
new system offers significant benefits for users of the NAS, for the safety and
convenience of the traveling public, and for greater FAA operational efficiency.
The FAA's proposed technical approach and schedule for NAS modernization are
documented in its recently published National Airspace System Architecture. The
proposed NAS architecture is generally consistent with industry's vision for the
future of air traffic management, but the proposed schedule for modernization is
too slow to meet projected demands and funding issues are not adequately
addressed. Unless the schedule is accelerated, the United States may lose its
position of global leadership in civil aviation.
The technology needed to modernize the ATC system by and large exists, and is
available off-the-shelf. The challenge is completing the transition to the new
system in a timely and cost-effective manner, and ensuring that all users
participate in the upgrade. Unfortunately, the FAA has encountered serious
problems in its modernization program. Before major changes were made in 1994,
the centerpiece of the FAA's modernization program had, according to the General
Accounting Office, fallen eight years behind schedule, and was $5 billion over
budget. Cost overruns in five other key programs ranged from 50 to more than
500%, and delays averaged close to four years.
These problems have been traced to inadequate user input, poor management and
contractor performance, and inadequate oversight. Although availability of funds
does not appear to have been a problem in the past, the capital needs of the
future could well outstrip the ability to fund them through the traditional
budget process, particularly as capital improvements are accelerated, as
recommended by the Commission.
Traditionally, the FAA has seen it necessary to design, own and operate its
air traffic control system, in cooperation with the Department of Defense.
Current off-the-shelf technology allows the FAA to consider its needs
differently, particularly in areas such as the acquisition of communications
systems. In other critical areas of government, including Defense, the private
sector has proved its ability to provide critical services with increased
quality and lower costs. A number of major U.S. manufacturers are producing new
ATC systems for deployment in other countries. The FAA should seek collaborative
opportunities with the private sector in order to accelerate the transition to a
new NAS.
There have been several important changes that should allow the modernization
program to move forward more effectively. The Commission notes, in particular,
the following factors which should help avoid problems of the past: the
redefinition of the modernization program; the personnel and procurement reforms
granted the FAA, which give it unprecedented ability to hold managers
accountable for results and to streamline procurement processes; and the
creation of the new Management Advisory Committee by the Congress, which will
give users a more effective voice in decision-making. However, the Commission
believes that a new long-term financing mechanism is also necessary to ensure
that modernization occurs on an acceptable schedule, and that the resulting
safety and efficiency benefits are realized faster.
The FAA must take advantage of personnel, procurement, and other reforms to
ensure that it is spending existing resources more effectively in order to gain
approval of innovative funding proposals from the Administration and the
Congress. Additionally, the Commission believes that it is critical that the
senior management at the DOT and the FAA take additional steps to ensure that
past problems are being dealt with, and that an accelerated modernization
schedule can proceed.
Recommendations
2.1. The FAA should develop a revised NAS modernization plan within six
months that will set a goal of the modernized system being fully operational
nationwide by the year 2005; and the Congress, the Administration, and users
should develop innovative means of financing this acceleration.
Modernization of our aging airspace system is critical to the safety of the
traveling public, to maintaining our world leadership in aviation, and to our
economic interests. The FAA's current plan calls for the modernized system to be
operational after 2012. That is simply too long to postpone the safety and
economic benefits that will derive from the modernized system. Therefore, the
Commission recommends that 2005 be set as the date when all elements of the
communication, navigation, and surveillance and air traffic management
capabilities defined in the NAS architecture should be fully operational. This
accelerated implementation must be coordinated with the Department of Defense,
which is a major user and provider of air traffic control services.
Implementation of the initiative announced by Vice President Gore on January 15,
1997 to demonstrate these systems in Hawaii and Alaska is an important step
toward full operational status.
Achieving this goal depends on the availability of several tools, as
discussed in the following recommendations. Chief among these tools is the need
to find non-traditional means of financing the capital improvements. Innovative
approaches to federal financing of major infrastructure projects have been
proposed in the past, including leveraging the revenues coming into the FAA,
multi-year appropriations and non-traditional budget scoring. Non-federal
financing approaches have also been proposed, such as the creation of private
infrastructure banks. The Commission expects that the National Civil Aviation
Review Commission (NCARC), established in the Federal Aviation Reauthorization
Act of 1996 by Congress to explore funding options for the FAA, will consider
these options. Whatever the funding mechanism selected, the Commission believes
it is critical to our global leadership in civil aviation to finance an
accelerated modernization of the NAS.
2.2. The FAA should develop plans to ensure that operational and
airport capacity needs are integrated into the modernization of the NAS.
The FAA's current NAS modernization program focuses on equipment and
infrastructure. However, there is no clear plan for how the people who operate
the system will make the transition, and what their roles and responsibilities
will be under the new systems. The FAA should develop immediately a NAS
Operational Plan to address these issues.
The FAA should also develop a National Airport System Modernization Plan that
presents a strategic vision, plan and schedule for modernization of U.S.
airports that is consistent with modernization of the NAS. This plan, produced
in collaboration with local airport officials, should identify critical system
capacity enhancement needs and should address major safety issues at airports.
These plans, when incorporated into the revised NAS implementation plan called
for in recommendation 2.1, would provide a balanced strategic plan for aviation
in the United States.
2.3. The FAA should explore innovative means to accelerate the
installation of advanced avionics in general aviation aircraft.
The safety and efficiency benefits of the modernized NAS will not be realized
fully until all users have incorporated its features. Delays in the installation
of the equipment needed to operate in the future NAS will put off the benefits
for all system users. Therefore, it is essential that the FAA, as it accelerates
its modernization, works with users to ensure that they keep pace.
Savings from more efficient operations provide significant incentive for
commercial carriers to install the required digital radios, GPS receivers, and
automatic dependent surveillance equipment. But it is essential to find ways to
ensure general aviation users are equipped for future NAS operations.
2.4. The U.S. government should ensure the accuracy, availability and
reliability of the GPS system to accelerate its use in NAS modernization and to
encourage its acceptance as an international standard for aviation.
Satellite-based navigation and positioning is a core element of our NAS
modernization plans, and is critical to achieving a seamless, efficient global
aviation system in the future. The U.S. Global Positioning System (GPS), which
is a dual civil-military system operated by the U.S. Air Force, is the current
and foreseeable backbone for any global navigation satellite system. Full
acceptance of GPS as an international standard for aviation is dependent on
greater assurance to the user community -- both foreign and domestic -- of its
accuracy, availability and reliability. As part of its NAS modernization plans,
the FAA is currently developing a Wide Area Augmentation System (WAAS) that will
enhance the basic GPS civil service to meet the requirements of civil aviation
users. Many other nations, including Europe and Japan, are planning similar
augmentations, but are still somewhat reluctant to base their own airspace
management on a GPS system which they perceive to be controlled by the U.S.
military.
The recent U.S. GPS policy made considerable progress in addressing these
international concerns by assuring the continued availability of basic civil GPS
services worldwide, free of direct user fees. This new policy also established a
joint civil-military Executive Board to manage GPS and its augmentations, and
initiated formal international discussions aimed at developing agreements on the
provision and use of GPS services. But, there are still a number of important
technical and policy issues that must be resolved if GPS is to become the system
of choice for global aviation navigation and positioning.
First, the U.S. must provide stronger strategic leadership for civil users
of GPS. The acceptance of GPS as an international standard is key to
continued U.S. leadership in aviation, and can only be achieved through strong
civilian participation in GPS planning and decision-making. A number of working
groups and advisory committees currently exist throughout the Federal government
and the private sector to coordinate and represent the needs of civil users of
GPS. The Commission recommends that civilian leadership be strengthened by
establishing a Civil GPS Users Advisory Council, with representatives from both
the users and providers of GPS equipment and services, reporting to the GPS
Executive Board. The Commission also encourages the Administration to work
rapidly on the development of international guidelines on the provision and use
of GPS services called for in the President's recent GPS policy directive.
Second, greater redundancy is needed to enhance the ability of users to
cross-check GPS accuracy and to verify the system's reliability. The most
effective means of achieving this redundancy is to provide additional civil GPS
precision ranging signals in space. Studies have shown that additional precision
ranging capability can be achieved at relatively little cost while providing
enormous benefits to all civil GPS users. The Commission recommends that this
capability be added to the FAA's WAAS system. This action will result in a more
robust and inherently more reliable system and will provide a major boost to the
international acceptance of GPS as a standard for aviation navigation and
positioning.
Third, the GPS Executive Board should resolve the remaining issues over
funding and frequency assignment for a second civil frequency as quickly as
possible so that this needed improvement can be included in the next generation
of GPS satellites. The GPS Executive Board is considering enhancements to
future GPS satellites that would include an additional broadcast frequency. This
additional frequency would expand the base of civil GPS users worldwide and
would send a strong message to the international community that the U.S. intends
to maintain a long-term commitment to providing civil GPS services. Moreover,
the FAA's WAAS system requires two frequencies to meet the accuracy needs of
civil aviation users, and the additional frequency would allow for complete
independence of civil and military GPS services in the future.
Fourth, the GPS system must be protected from both intentional and
unintentional interference. The GPS system will be a core, safety-critical
component of the future global aviation information system. The security of GPS
should be a major consideration in carrying out Recommendation 3.6 for
protecting all aviation information systems.
2.5. The users of the NAS should fund its development and operation.
The current system of funding the ATC system provides little direct
connection between the excise taxes paid and services provided or the amount
made available to the FAA through the budget and appropriations process.
Replacing the traditional system of excise taxes with user fees offers the
potential to correlate revenues and spending more closely.* Importantly, a
financing system would not only help ensure adequate availability of funding ,
but would also build incentives for efficiency and safety into the system --
both for the users and for the FAA. The National Civil Aviation Review
Commission is the proper venue for resolving the details of a new user fee
system, and the Commission expects that it will be formed and begin its work in
the very near future. The Commission urges the NCARC, in designing a new
financing system, to ensure that any changes in the relative amount of revenues
generated from any segment of the aviation industry do not result in undue
economic disruption within any segment of the industry, and that the fees are
not discriminatory or anti-competitive among carriers. In addition, non-business
general aviation users of the NAS should not be adversely impacted by any new
financing system. This will help ensure that general aviation users will be full
and willing participants in the modernized NAS.
* Commissioner. Coleman takes no position with respect to the first two
sentences of recommendation 2.5 as he feels this is among the issues NCARC is to
resolve.
2.6. The FAA should identify and justify by July 1997 the
frequency spectrum necessary for the transition to a modernized air traffic
control system.
Expansion of telecommunications and other industries is creating greater
competition for frequency spectrum. The FAA has indicated a need to retain large
segments of its current spectrum allocation, but has provided insufficient
justification for doing so. To ensure that the FAA's spectrum needs during
modernization are not compromised the Commission recommends that the FAA
complete a full justification, as well as a plan for freeing up spectrum as
older systems are modernized or decommissioned. This process must be
completed not later than July, 1997, and the results included by the DOT in the
Federal Radio Navigation Plan and the RTCA 185 Report: Aeronautical Spectrum
Planning for the Years 1997-2010.
Chapter Three:
Improving Security for Travelers
"We know we can't make the world risk-free, but we can reduce the
risks we face and we have to take the fight to the terrorists. If we have the
will, we can find the means."
President Clinton
The Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Central Intelligence Agency, and
other intelligence sources have been warning that the threat of terrorism is
changing in two important ways. First, it is no longer just an overseas threat
from foreign terrorists. People and places in the United States have joined the
list of targets, and Americans have joined the ranks of terrorists. The bombings
of the World Trade Center in New York and the Federal Building in Oklahoma City
are clear examples of the shift, as is the conviction of Ramzi Yousef for
attempting to bomb twelve American airliners out of the sky over the Pacific
Ocean. The second change is that in addition to well-known, established
terrorist groups, it is becoming more common to find terrorists working alone or
in ad-hoc groups, some of whom are not afraid to die in carrying out their
designs.
Although the threat of terrorism is increasing, the danger of an individual
becoming a victim of a terrorist attack -- let alone an aircraft bombing -- will
doubtless remain very small. But terrorism isn't merely a matter of statistics.
We fear a plane crash far more than we fear something like a car accident. One
might survive a car accident, but there's no chance in a plane at 30,000 feet.
This fear is one of the reasons that terrorists see airplanes as attractive
targets. And, they know that airlines are often seen as national symbols.
When terrorists attack an American airliner, they are attacking the United
States. They have so little respect for our values -- so little regard for human
life or the principles of justice that are the foundation of American society --
that they would destroy innocent children and devoted mothers and fathers
completely at random. This cannot be tolerated, or allowed to intimidate free
societies. There must be a concerted national will to fight terrorism. There
must be a willingness to apply sustained economic, political and commercial
pressure on countries sponsoring terrorists. There must be an unwavering
commitment to pursuing terrorists and bringing them to justice. There must be
the resolve to punish those who would violate sanctions imposed against
terrorist states.
Today's aviation security is based in part on the defenses erected in the
1970s against hijackers and on recommendations made by the Commission on
Aviation Security and Terrorism, which was formed in the wake of the bombing of
Pan Am 103 over Lockerbie, Scotland. Improvements in aviation security have been
complicated because government and industry often found themselves at odds,
unable to resolve disputes over financing, effectiveness, technology, and
potential impacts on operations and passengers.
Americans should not have to choose between enhanced security and efficient
and affordable air travel. Both goals are achievable if the federal government,
airlines, airports, aviation employees, local law enforcement agencies, and
passengers work together to achieve them. Accordingly, the Commission recommends
a new partnership that will marshal resources more effectively, and focus all
parties on achieving the ultimate goal: enhancing the security of air travel for
Americans.
The Commission considered the question of whether or not the FAA is the
appropriate government agency to have the primary responsibility for regulating
aviation security. The Commission believes that, because of its extensive
interactions with airlines and airports, the FAA is the appropriate agency, with
the following qualifications: first, that the FAA must improve the way it
carries out its mission; and second, that the roles of intelligence and law
enforcement agencies in supporting the FAA must be more clearly defined and
coordinated. The Commission's recommendations address those conditions.
The terrorist threat is changing and growing. Therefore, it is important to
improve security not just against familiar threats, such as explosives in
checked baggage, but also to explore means of assessing and countering emerging
threats, such as the use of biological or chemical agents, or the use of
missiles. While these do not present significant threats at present, it would be
short-sighted not to plan for their possible use and take prudent steps to
counter them.
The Commission believes that aviation security should be a system of systems,
layered, integrated, and working together to produce the highest possible levels
of protection. Each of the Commission's recommendations should be looked upon as
a part of a whole, and not in isolation. It should be noted that a number of the
Commission's recommendations outlined in the previous chapter, particularly
those relating to certification and regulation, apply to the FAA's security
programs, as well.
Recommendations
3.1. The federal government should consider aviation security as a
national security issue, and provide substantial funding for capital
improvements.
The Commission believes that terrorist attacks on civil aviation are directed
at the United States, and that there should be an ongoing federal commitment to
reducing the threats that they pose. In its initial report, the Commission
called for approximately $160 million in federal funds for capital costs
associated with improving security, and Congress agreed. As part of its ongoing
commitment, the federal government should devote significant resources, of
approximately $100 million annually, to meet capital requirements identified by
airport consortia and the FAA. The Commission recognizes that more is needed.
The Commission expects the National Civil Aviation Review Commission to consider
a variety of options for additional user fees that could be used to pay for
security measures including, among others, an aviation user security surcharge,
the imposition of local security fees, tax incentives and other means.
3.2. The FAA should establish federally mandated standards for security
enhancements.
These enhancements should include standards for use of Explosive Detection
System (EDS) machines, training programs for security personnel, use of
automated bag match technology, development of profiling programs (manual and
automated), and deployment of explosive detection canine teams.
3.3. The Postal Service should advise customers that all packages
weighing over 16 ounces will be subject to examination for explosives and other
threat objects in order to move by air.
The Postal Service now requires that packages weighing over 16 ounces must be
brought to a post office, rather than be placed in a mailbox. To improve
security further, the Postal Service should mandate that all mail
weighing over 16 ounces contain a written release that allows it to be examined
by explosive detection systems in order to be shipped by air. The Postal Service
should develop and implement procedures to randomly screen such packages for
explosives and other threat objects. If necessary, the Postal Service should
seek appropriate legislation to accomplish this.
3.4. Current law should be amended to clarify the U.S. Customs
Service's authority to search outbound international mail.
Currently, the Customs Service searches for explosives and other threat
objects on inbound mail and cargo. This recommended legislative enhancement
parallels the Customs Service's existing border search authority.
3.5. The FAA should implement a comprehensive plan to address the
threat of explosives and other threat objects in cargo and work with industry to
develop new initiatives in this area.
The FAA should place greater emphasis on the work of teams, such as the
Aviation Security Advisory Committee and the Baseline Cargo Working Group, to
address cargo issues. The Commission believes that the FAA should implement the
Baseline Group's recommendation with regard to profiling by "known"
and "unknown" shippers. In addition, unaccompanied express shipments
on commercial passenger aircraft should be subject to examination by explosives
detection systems; the FAA should work with industry to develop a computer
assisted cargo profiling system that can be integrated into airlines' and
forwarders' reservation and operating systems; requirements should be
implemented requiring that trucks delivering cargo for loading on planes be
sealed and locked; the FAA should develop and distribute air cargo security
training materials; and enhanced forwarder and shipper employee screening
procedures should be developed.
3.6. The FAA should establish a security system that will provide a
high level of protection for all aviation information systems.
In addition to improving the physical security of the traveling public,
information systems critical to aircraft, air traffic control and airports
should also be protected. Although government is responsible for a great number
of aviation related information systems, a partnership must be formed in order
to create integrated protection among these and related private sector systems.
Some protective measures will become the responsibility of airlines, some that
of the airports and others of the aircraft and air traffic control systems
manufacturers and maintenance providers. The National Security Agency must play
a role in coordinating information security measures, setting standards and
providing oversight of system security to ensure protection against outside
interference, disruption and corruption. Specific legislation should be reviewed
that makes willful interference with information systems a federal crime with
substantial penalties to provide a clear deterrent.
3.7. The FAA should work with airlines and airport consortia to ensure
that all passengers are positively identified and subjected to security
procedures before they board aircraft.
Curb-side check-in, electronic ticketing, advance boarding passes, and other
initiatives are affecting the way passengers enter the air transportation
system. As improved security procedures are put into place, it is essential that
all passengers be accounted for in that system, properly identified and subject
to the same level of scrutiny. The Commission urges the FAA to work with
airlines and airport consortia to ensure that necessary changes are made to
accomplish that goal.
3.8. Submit a proposed resolution, through the U.S.
Representative, that the International Civil Aviation Organization begin a
program to verify and improve compliance with international security standards.
Although 185 nations have ratified the International Civil Aviation
Organization convention, and the security standards contained in it, compliance
is not uniform. This creates the potential for security vulnerabilities on
connecting flights throughout the world. To help raise levels of security
throughout the world, the International Civil Aviation Organization needs
greater authority to determine whether nations are in compliance. Strong U.S.
sponsorship for adding verification and compliance capabilities to the
International Civil Aviation Organization could lead to enhanced worldwide
aviation security.
3.9. Assess the possible use of chemical and biological weapons as
tools of terrorism.
FAA should work with the Department of Defense and the Department of Energy
on programs to anticipate and plan for changing threats, such as chemical and
biological agents.
3.10. The FAA should work with industry to develop a national program
to increase the professionalism of the aviation security workforce, including
screening personnel.
The Commission believes it's critical to ensure that those charged with
providing security for over 500 million passengers a year in the United States
are the best qualified and trained in the industry. One proposal that could
accomplish this goal is the creation of a nationwide non-profit security
corporation, funded by the airlines, to handle airport security. This concept,
under consideration by the major airlines, merits further review.
The Commission recommends that the FAA work with the private sector and other
federal agencies to promote the professionalism of security personnel through a
program that could include: licensing and performance standards that reflect
best practices; adequate, common and recurrent training that considers human
factors; emphasis on reducing turnover rates; rewards for performance;
opportunities for advancement; a national rank and grade structure to permit
employees to find opportunities in other areas; regional and national
competitions to identify highly skilled teams; and, an agreement among users to
hire based on performance, not just cost.
3.11 Access to airport controlled areas must be secured and the
physical security of aircraft must be ensured.
Air carriers and airport authorities, working with FAA, must develop
comprehensive and effective means by which to secure aircraft and other
controlled areas from unauthorized access and intrusion. Use of radio frequency
transponders to track the location of people and objects in airport controlled
areas, including aircraft, offers significant advantages over the current
security measures commonly used today. Where adequate airport controlled area
and aircraft security are not assured by other means, this technology should be
considered for use at both international and domestic airports.
The Following Recommendations Were Presented to President Clinton
on September
9, 1996 (link taken down by current administration) 3.12. Establish consortia at all commercial airports to implement
enhancements to aviation safety and security.
Recommendation from Initial Report dated September 9, 1996
Establish consortia at all commercial airports to implement
enhancements to aviation safety and security. The Commission is
convinced that safety, security, efficiency, and affordability can go hand in
hand if all parties work as partners. The FAA should direct its officials
responsible for oversight of security procedures at the nation's 450 commercial
airports to convene relevant aviation and law enforcement entities for the
purpose of implementing the Commission's recommendations and further improving
aviation safety and security. At each airport, these partners will: (1)
immediately conduct a vulnerability assessment; and (2) based on that
assessment, develop an action plan that includes the deployment of new
technology and processes to enhance aviation safety and security.
The FAA will approve these action plans on an expedited basis; procure and
allocate, based on availability, new equipment; and test airports to ensure that
the plans are being implemented properly.
Status
Forty-one major airport consortia have submitted action plans for FAA
review.
The Commission's most important recommendation in its initial report was that
local consortia be convened to identify vulnerabilities and propose action
plans. The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) called for initial consortia
meetings by September 27, 1996, at 41 major U.S. airports where FAA personnel
are permanently deployed. By December 2, 1996, all consortia action plans or
reports from these airports had been presented to the FAA for review. The
consortia action plans defined local security threat conditions based on input
from FAA and the Federal Bureau of Investigation. Consortia also assessed other
areas such as personnel training, passenger screening, access control measures,
and equipment and technology needs.
Augmenting Recommendation
The FAA should formalize the establishment of consortia at all Category X
through Category III airports by September 30, 1997, and, after consultation
with industry, issue guidance on the future of consortia.
3.13. Conduct airport vulnerability assessments and
develop action plans.
Recommendation from Initial Report dated September 9, 1996
Conduct airport vulnerability assessments and develop action plans.
Using models already developed by Sandia National Laboratory, periodic
vulnerability assessments of the nation's commercial airports should be
conducted. Based on the results, action plans tailored to each airport will be
developed for expedited approval by the FAA.
Status
Law enforcement agencies are conducting assessments and addressing
problems.
The FAA Authorization Act of 1996 required the FAA and FBI to conduct joint
threat and vulnerability assessments on security every three years, or more
frequently if necessary, at each airport determined to be high risk.
In November 1996, officials from the FBI, FAA and Department of
Transportation (DOT) established a working group to define "high risk"
airports. Discussions have been held on the criteria to be used to identify an
airport facility as high risk, methodology to use in conducting joint FAA/FBI
vulnerability assessments, and which airports should be assessed on a priority
basis. The target date for completing the procedures for conducting
vulnerability assessments is April 30, 1997, and initial assessments are to
begin by late June, 1997.
3.14. Require criminal background checks and FBI
fingerprint checks for all screeners, and all airport and airline employees with
access to secure areas.
Recommendation from Initial Report dated September 9, 1996
Require criminal background checks and FBI fingerprint checks for all
screeners, and all airport and airline employees with access to secure areas.
Currently, employees, including those with unescorted access to secure areas
of airports, are not subject to such review. Given the risks associated with the
potential introduction of explosives into these areas, the Commission recommends
that screeners and employees with access to secure areas be subject to criminal
background checks and FBI fingerprint checks.
Status
The FBI has reduced fingerprint check turnaround time to at most seven
days.
The FBI has expedited the processing of aviation related fingerprint
submissions. The FBI will accelerate its efforts to make software modifications
and purchase additional computer hardware to adapt its Electronic Fingerprinting
Image Print Server (EFIPS) system to accept civil fingerprint cards.
Augmenting Recommendation
The Commission reiterates that the overall goal is FBI fingerprint checks of
all airport and airline employees with access to secure areas, no later than
mid-1999.
3.15 Deploy existing technology.
Recommendation from Initial Report dated September 9, 1996
Deploy existing technology. The Commission has reviewed
numerous machines designed to detect explosives in cargo, checked baggage,
carry-on bags, and on passengers. There is no silver bullet. No single machine
offers a solution to the challenges we face. Each machine has its own advantages
and its own limitations. Even machines that work fairly well in the laboratory
need to be tested in actual use at busy airports. We recognize that the FAA has
certified only one technology for baggage screening, but we believe we must get
a variety of machines, including some in use in other countries, into the field.
There day-to-day operators can figure out which equipment works best in what
situations and combinations, and what features need to be improved. Finding the
strengths and weakness of existing technology will spur industry's creativity,
leading to the invention of better and better instruments. Ultimately, the goal
should be to deploy equipment that can be certified by the FAA to detect
explosives likely to be used by terrorists.
The Commission recommends the government purchase significant numbers of
computed tomography detection systems, upgraded x-rays, and other innovative
systems. By deploying equipment widely, passengers throughout the aviation
system will receive the benefits of the enhancements. The Commission strongly
believes it would be improper to discuss the details of such deployment, as to
do so would serve only to compromise the integrity of an enhanced security
system.
The Commission recommends that this initial equipment purchase be paid for
with appropriated funds. This recommendation does not settle the issue of how
security costs will be financed in the long run. That will be dealt with in our
final report.
Status
Congress funded the purchase of commercially available advanced
security screening equipment.
The FAA has ordered 54 advanced explosives detection systems.
In November and December 1996, FAA awarded six fixed priced contracts to
various manufacturers of explosives trace detection technologies.
Augmenting Recommendation
The Commission recognizes that deployed technology for examining carry-on
baggage may be outdated. New developments such as computerized systems with high
resolution digital displays, innovative use of color to highlight threat
objects, and ability to accommodate technologies such as threat image projection
to maintain screener performance, can provide enhanced security. The FAA should
review available technology for screening carry on items, regularly update
minimum standards for new installations, and develop programs for upgrading
deployed technology.
Cross Reference to Related Recommendations
This recommendation is related to recommendation 3.2.
3.16. Establish a joint government-industry research and
development program.
Recommendation from Initial Report dated September 9, 1996
Establish a joint government-industry research and development program.
The Commission recommends the establishment of a new joint government -
industry partnership whose mission will be to accelerate research and
development to enhance the security of air travel.
This could be modeled on the Partnership For A New Generation Vehicle (PNGV),
in which the federal government and auto makers are combining resources to
develop automobiles with significantly enhanced fuel economy, safety, and
reduced emissions. We propose to increase federal funding and to ask the private
sector to contribute.
Status
The FAA is working with industry to develop agreements and award
research grants.
Congress increased the federal funding of R&D as required.
The FAA is moving in the direction of interacting more closely with industry,
having set up advisory mechanisms such as the Aviation Security Advisory
Committee; participating in individual Cooperative Research and Development
Agreements with individual firms; giving grants to airlines and airports to
conduct demonstrations and otherwise involve themselves in security technology
development; entering into cost-sharing arrangements with firms to develop
security technology.
Augmenting Recommendation
The FAA received additional funding and has aggressively accelerated systems
to (1) improve screener performance, (2) reduce aircraft vulnerability, (3)
screen cargo, and (4) to develop options for dealing with threats other than
explosives. The FAA is encouraged to use the best technology available to solve
security and safety challenges throughout the air transportation system.
3.17. Establish an interagency task force to assess the potential use
of surface-to-air missiles against commercial aircraft.
Recommendation from Initial Report dated September 9, 1996
Assess the viability of anti-missile defense systems..
Whether or not the explosion of TWA 800 turns out to have been due to a
surface-to-air missile attack, as some eye-witness accounts suggest, missile
attacks have downed passenger planes in other countries, and it is a risk that
should be evaluated. The Commission will continue to analyze this problem in
cooperation with the Department of Defense and other government agencies.
Status
DoD will convene an interagency task force to examine the threat to
civil aircraft.
Initial analyses of both the missile threat and electronic systems available
to counter it support a decision to take positive steps. Experts from the
Department of Defense (DoD), the intelligence community, defense contractors and
research scientists contributed to analysis of the viability of anti-missile
defense systems for civil aviation.
Augmenting Recommendation
Within ninety days, the Department of Defense should convene an interagency
task force including the DOT, the FAA and the intelligence community to address
the potential threat from surface-to-air missiles against commercial aviation.
Working with airport consortia, this task force should develop plans to provide
increased surveillance, and, if necessary, the deployment of countermeasures.
The task force should make recommendations to the DOT regarding the testing,
evaluation and preparation for deployment of measures to protect civil aircraft
against an increased threat from surface-to-air missiles.
Appropriate steps should be taken by the intelligence community and through
international diplomacy to reduce the possibility that terrorists could obtain
or use surface-to-air missiles. The State Department should study the expansion
of conventional arms agreements to include man-portable surface-to-air missiles,
and the U.S. Representative to the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO)
should propose a new convention addressing these weapons.
3.18. Significantly expand the use of bomb-sniffing dogs.
Recommendation from Initial Report dated September 9, 1996
Significantly expand the use of bomb-sniffing dogs.
Canines are used to detect explosives in many important areas, but only
sparingly in airport security. The Commission is convinced that an increase in
the number of well-trained dogs and handlers can make a significant and rapid
improvement in security, and recommends the deployment of 114 additional teams.
Status
The FAA received funding for 114 new dog teams and training has begun.
Augmenting Recommendation
Additionally, the Commission recommends that ATF continue to work to develop
government-wide standards for canine teams.
3.19. Complement technology with automated passenger
profiling.
Recommendation from Initial Report dated September 9, 1996
Complement technology with automated passenger profiling.
Profiling can leverage an investment in technology and trained people. Based on
information that is already in computer databases, passengers could be separated
into a very large majority who present little or no risk, and a small minority
who merit additional attention.
Such systems are employed successfully by other agencies, including the
Customs Service. By utilizing this process Customs is better able to focus its
resources and attention. As a result, many legitimate travelers never see a
customs agent anymore -- and drug busts are way up.
The FAA and Northwest Airlines are developing an automated profiling system
tailored to aviation security, and the Commission supports the continued
development and implementation of such a system.
To improve and promote passenger profiling, the Commission recommends three
steps. First, FBI, CIA, and BATF should evaluate and expand the research into
known terrorists, hijackers, and bombers needed to develop the best possible
profiling system. They should keep in mind that such a profile would be most
useful to the airlines if it could be matched against automated passenger
information which the airlines maintain.
Second, the FBI and CIA should develop a system that would allow important
intelligence information on known or suspected terrorists to be used in
passenger profiling without compromising the integrity of the intelligence or
its sources. Similar systems have been developed to give environmental
scientists access to sensitive data collected by satellites.
Third, the Commission will establish an advisory board on civil liberties
questions that arise from the development and use of profiling systems.
Status
Profiling systems are being developed.
The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) and Northwest Airlines are
completing final programming changes to an automated profiling system. A
tentative completion date for programming changes and implementation of Computer
Assisted Passenger Screening (CAPS) on Northwest flights is April, 1997.
Additional programming will begin for use of CAPS on other airline reservations
systems, with a tentative completion date of August, 1997.
On January 17, 1997, a Civil Liberties Advisory Board met with Commissioners
to discuss civil liberties concerns pertaining to profiling. The Board submitted
recommendations to the Commission. (Appendix A)
Augmenting Recommendation
The Commission believes that profiling is one part of a comprehensive,
layered security program. As with other measures, it becomes less necessary with
the introduction of efficient screening technology. Based on readily-available
information, passengers could be separated into a very large majority about whom
we know enough to conclude that they present little or no risk, and a small
minority about whom we do not know enough and who merit additional attention.
The Customs Service uses this approach successfully to better focus its
resources and attention. As a result, many legitimate travelers never see a
customs agent anymore -- and drug busts are way up.
The Commission supports the development and implementation of manual and
automated profiling systems, such as the one under development by the FAA and
Northwest Airlines. The Commission strongly believes the civil liberties that
are so fundamentally American should not, and need not, be compromised by a
profiling system. Consistent with this viewpoint, the Commission sought the
counsel of leading experts in the civil liberties field. Those experts provided
a series of recommendations found in Appendix A. The Commission recommends the
following safeguards:
- No profile should contain or be based on material of a
constitutionally suspect nature - e.g., race, religion, national origin of
U.S. citizens. The Commission recommends that the elements of a profiling
system be developed in consultation with the Department of Justice and other
appropriate experts to ensure that selection is not impermissibly based on
national origin, racial, ethnic, religious or gender characteristics.
- Factors to be considered for elements of the profile should be based
on measurable, verifiable data indicating that the factors chosen are
reasonable predictors of risk, not stereotypes or generalizations. A
relationship must be demonstrated between the factors chosen and the risk of
illegal activity.
- Passengers should be informed of airlines security procedures and of
their right to avoid any search of their person or luggage by electing not
to board the aircraft.
- Searches arising from the use of an automated profiling system
should be no more intrusive than search procedures that could be applied to
all passengers. Procedures for searching the person or luggage of, or for
questioning, a person who is selected by the automated profiling system
should be premised on insuring respectful, non-stigmatizing, and efficient
treatment of all passengers.
- Neither the airlines nor the government should maintain permanent
databases on selectees. Reasonable restrictions on the maintenance of
records and strict limitations on the dissemination of records should be
developed.
- Periodic independent reviews of profiling procedures should be made.
The Commission considered whether an independent panel be appointed to
monitor implementation and recommends at a minimum that the DOJ, in
consultation with the DOT and FAA, periodically review the profiling
standards and create an outside panel should that, in their judgment, be
necessary.
- The Commission reiterates that profiling should last only until
Explosive Detection Systems are reliable and fully deployed.
- The Commission urges that these elements be embodied in FAA
standards that must be strictly observed.
3.20. Certify screening companies and improve screener performance.
Recommendation from Initial Report dated September 9, 1996
Certify screening companies and improve screener performance.
Better selection, training, and testing of the people who work at airport x-ray
machines would result in a significant boost in security. The Commission
recommends development of uniform performance standards for the selection,
training, certification, and recertification of screening companies and their
employees. The Commission further recommends that in developing these standards,
the FAA give serious consideration to implementing the National Research Council
recommendations. The Commission also recommends the purchase and deployment of
SPEARS, a computerized training and testing system.
Status
The FAA has begun rulemaking procedures to require new certifications.
The Federal Aviation Administration is developing an Advanced Notice of
Proposed Rulemaking (ANPRM) which will establish the requirement for screening
companies to be certified in order to provide screening services to air
carriers. The rule will include requirements to improve the training and testing
of security screeners through development of uniform performance standards for
providing security screening services. Congress gave FAA authority to certify
screening companies, but did not provide FAA authority to certify individual
screeners. This Commission urges Congress to provide that additional authority.
Augmenting Recommendation
The Commission also recommends that the purchase and deployment of SPEARS, a
computerized training and testing system, be completed at all major airports by
the end of 1997.
3.21. Aggressively test existing security systems.
Recommendation from Initial Report dated September 9, 1996
Aggressively test existing security systems. "Red
team" (adversary) type testing should also be increased by the FAA, and
incorporated as a regular part of airport security action plans. Frequent,
sophisticated attempts by these red teams to find ways to dodge security
measures are an important part of finding weaknesses in the system and
anticipating what sophisticated adversaries of our nation might attempt. An
aggressive red team strategy will require significant increases in the number of
FAA personnel currently assigned to these tasks.
Status
The FAA is hiring 300 new special agents to test airport security.
3.22. Use the Customs Service to enhance security.
Recommendation from Initial Report dated September 9, 1996
Use the Customs Service to enhance security. The Customs
Service has many responsibilities that are parallel to the FAA's in dealing with
airlines and contraband. As a law enforcement agency, Customs has authorities
and tools not available to the FAA. Further, it has developed successful
partnership programs with the airlines. By using the Customs Service to
complement the FAA, FBI, and other agencies, the Commission believes that
aviation security would be significantly enhanced.
The Customs Service has thousands of agents currently stationed at US
international airports. Customs has statutory authority to search people and
cargo to stop contraband from coming in or going out of the country. Customs has
arrangements with most airlines to receive automated passenger and cargo
manifests. These arrangements could be adapted for use in security procedures.
Customs, as a law enforcement agency, has access to automated law enforcement
databases that could be an invaluable tool in fighting not just drugs but
terrorism. The Commission recommends that Customs upgrade and adapt its computer
systems to take on this additional responsibility.
Status
The Customs Service is deploying 140 inspectors and investigators to
critical airports.
The U.S. Customs Service is in the process of deploying 140 inspectors,
intelligence analysts, and criminal investigators (special agents) to critical
airports, for aviation security; anti-terrorism efforts, and to perform
increased searches of passengers, baggage, and cargo departing the United
States. Customs is purchasing and deploying additional x-ray vans, tool trucks
and radiation detector pagers at critical airports to assist in these searches.
The Customs Service and the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) are working
with an FAA contractor to study the technical issues associated with converting
Customs' Automated Targeting System (ATS), which is designed for sea cargo
analysis, to air cargo analysis. Although ATS is designed for contraband
analysis and detection in the sea cargo environment, the plan would be to add
anti-terrorism criteria to the system and convert it to an air cargo
environment. The study should be completed in the Spring of 1997.
3.23. Give properly cleared airline and airport security
personnel access to the classified information they need to know.
Recommendation from Initial Report dated September 9, 1996
Give properly cleared airline and airport security personnel access to
the classified information they need to know. The red tape of
classification is getting in the way of security. There are two problems that
must be solved. The first involves intelligence information about specific
terrorist threats. The CIA or FBI pass the threat information to the FAA, which
in turn alerts the airlines. But the information gets progressively
"sanitized" to avoid jeopardizing the source. Often, airlines are just
told what to do but not why they are to do it. If airlines were provided more
information about the threat, they could help design more effective responses.
Corporate personnel are often cleared to know the most secret information
when national security is at stake. Defense contractors with access to highly
classified intelligence information are far from rare. For that matter, airline
personnel were cleared to know highly classified information during Operation
Desert Storm, when commercial aircraft transported 80% of our troops to Saudi
Arabia.
The other classified information problem involves the airport vulnerability
assessments in recommendation number 2. These assessments become classified
information if they conclude that a high degree of vulnerability exists. Some
people responsible for security at the airports are not cleared to receive
classified information.
The Commission recommends that the FAA arrange for appropriate airline and
airport security personnel to be cleared to address this problem.
Status
The FAA is arranging for adequate clearance levels at airports and
airlines.
The FAA has agreed to collaborate more closely with airlines and airports in
developing responses to threat information, and has agreed to disseminate
vulnerability assessments to properly cleared officials.
3.24. Begin implementation of full bag-passenger match.
Recommendation from Initial Report dated September 9, 1996
Begin implementation of full bag-passenger match. Matching
bags to passengers ensures that the baggage of anyone who does not board the
plane is removed. Full bag match ensures that no unaccompanied bag remains on
board a flight.
Manual and automated systems to conduct full bag match have been employed in
international aviation for several years, but need additional work to ensure
they can be phased into domestic airline operations. The Commission recommends
implementing full bag match at selected airports, including at least one hub,
within sixty days to determine the best means of implementing the process
system-wide.
Status
The Commission remains committed to baggage match as a component of a
comprehensive, layered security program aimed at keeping bombs and explosive
devices off airlines. New technologies are available which facilitate positive
and automated identification of the bag as it is tracked through the system.
Automatic bag tracking systems can also facilitate the removal of bags from
aircraft if required by security concerns. The Commission feels that these
technologies can be combined with the development of a passenger manifest to
implement a passenger-bag matching system as one component of a layered approach
to aviation security.
The Commission urges the industry and the FAA to work together to hasten the
development of sophisticated technology for determining the presence of
explosives in checked baggage. Until such machines are widely available, the
Commission believes that bag match, initially based on profiling, should be
implemented no later than December 31, 1997. The Commission's recommendation is
consistent with that of the Baseline Working Group's recommendation in this
contentious and difficult area.
By that date, the bags of those selected either at random or through the use
of automated profiling must either be screened or matched to a boarded
passenger. No unaccompanied bag should be transported on a passenger aircraft
unless (1) it has been screened by a screening method that meets the FAA
standard, or (2) it belongs to a passenger who at the time of check in was
neither randomly selected for security review nor selected by the profile for
further review. This approach is the most effective methodology available now.
It would allow the aviation industry to remove the unaccompanied bag or bags
which represent the greatest threat.
3.25. Provide more compassionate and effective assistance to families
of victims.
Recommendation from Initial Report dated September 9, 1996
Providing more compassionate and effective assistance to families of
victims. The tragedy of losing a loved one in an aviation
disaster can be unnecessarily and cruelly compounded by disjointed or incomplete
information in the aftermath of the incident. At the Commission's urging, the
President is directing the National Transportation Safety Board to take the lead
in coordinating provision of services to families of victims. The NTSB will work
with the Departments of State, Defense, Transportation, Health and Human
Services, the Federal Emergency Management Agency, and private organizations
like the Red Cross.
Status
The NTSB was given responsibility to coordinate response.
On October 9, 1996, Congress passed the Aviation Family Disaster Act of 1996
giving the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) the responsibility for
aiding families of aircraft accident victims and coordinating the federal
response to major domestic aviation accidents.
Since the signing of the law, NTSB has completed the initial phase of
coordinating the federal response to a major domestic aviation accident. The
NTSB is in the process of finalizing existing interim Memoranda of Understanding
with the Department of State, Department of Defense, Department of Health and
Human Services, Department of Justice, Department of Transportation, Federal
Emergency Management Agency, and the American Red Cross (ARC). The NTSB has been
vigorously assisting the airline industry to develop a model plan to address the
needs of aviation disaster victims and their families. Letters from Chairman Jim
Hall and DOT Secretary Federico Peņa went out in November, 1996, to airlines
informing them of their responsibility for producing an emergency response plan
as specified in section 703 of the Aviation Disaster Family Assistance Act of
1996.
An interim federal response has been developed by the NTSB that assigns
responsibilities to the airlines and participating federal agencies. The ARC
will be responsible for family care and mental health; the Department of Health
and Human Services (HHS) will be responsible for identification and preparation
of human remains (with support by the Department of Defense, as needed); and the
Department of State will assist the airlines and NTSB when foreign passengers
are involved in an aviation accident. The Federal Emergency Management Agency
will provide the NTSB with communications equipment and additional public
affairs personnel. If the aviation disaster is officially determined to be a
criminal act, the Department of Justice will provide information to families on
entitlements and benefits under the Victims of Crime Act. Many elements of the
interim NTSB plan were successfully implemented and tested following the United
Express Flight 5925/5926 accident in Quincy, Illinois on November 19, 1996.
The Department of Transportation and the NTSB have formed a task force to
provide recommendations on the issues elaborated in section 704 of the Aviation
Disaster Family Assistance Act of 1996. The task force includes officials from
the NTSB, Federal Emergency Management Agency, American Red Cross, airlines,
family groups, and organizations considered appropriate by the Secretary of
Transportation. Airlines are required by the Act to submit their plans to the
Secretary of Transportation and to the Chairman of the NTSB by April 9, 1996.
Cross Reference to Related Recommendations
This recommendation is related to recommendations 4.2 and 4.3.
3.26. Improve passenger manifests.
Recommendation from Initial Report dated September 9, 1996
Improve passenger manifests. The Commission believes that
Section 203 of the 1990 Aviation Security Improvement Act, which requires
airlines to keep a comprehensive passenger manifest for international flights,
should be implemented as quickly as possible. While Section 203 does not apply
to domestic flights, the Commission urges the Department of Transportation to
explore immediately the costs and effects of a similar requirement on the
domestic aviation system.
Status
The DOT is proceeding with rulemaking to require international and
domestic manifests.
The DOT has developed a draft rule covering domestic flight manifesting, and
an Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (ANPRM), should be issued in early
1997. The DOT anticipates an extensive comment period for the ANPRM, because no
data exist related to domestic flights. The final rule for domestic manifesting
is likely to be published in 1998.
3.27. Significantly increase the number of FBI agents
assigned to counterterrorism investigations, to improve intelligence, and to
crisis response.
Recommendation from Initial Report dated September 9, 1996
Significantly increase the number of FBI agents assigned to
counter-terrorism investigations, to improve intelligence, and to crisis
response. The Commission recognizes the vital role that the FBI
plays in fighting terrorism against Americans, and recommends that the agency's
ability to assess vulnerabilities, gather and analyze intelligence, and conduct
forensic investigations be augmented.
3.28 Provide anti-terrorism assistance in the form of airport security
training to countries where there are airports served by airlines flying to the
US.
Recommendation from Initial Report dated September 9, 1996
Provide anti-terrorism assistance in the form of airport security
training to countries where there are airports served by airlines flying to the
US. The Commission believes that it is important to raise the
level of security at all airports serving Americans. Assisting foreign countries
through training in explosive detection, post-blast investigation, VIP
protection, hostage negotiation, and incident management is an important means
of achieving this goal.
Status
The State Department and the FAA are sponsoring domestic and foreign
courses.
The Department of State and the FAA continue to jointly sponsor
Anti-Terrorism Assistance Training Programs. In FY 1997, six domestic law
enforcement classes and six international/foreign classes will be held.
3.29. Resolve outstanding issues relating to explosive taggants and
require their use.
Recommendation from Initial Report dated September 9, 1996
Resolve outstanding issues relating to explosive taggants and require
their use. The use of taggants can be a critical aid when investigating
explosions on aircraft and in bringing terrorists to justice. The Commission
recommends that remaining issues relating to the use of these taggants,
including the analysis of black and smokeless powder, be resolved as quickly as
possible, and that requirements for the use of taggants then be put into place.
Status
Studies by the ATF have been initiated, with results expected in April,
1997.
ATF has contracted with the National Academy of Sciences/National Research
Council to conduct an independent study. The International Fertilizer
Development Center is under contract with ATF to conduct a study on the economic
and agronomic effects of tagging ammonium nitrate fertilizer. A report is due to
Congress on the study findings late in April, 1997.
3.30. Provide regular, comprehensive explosives detection training
programs for foreign, federal, state, and local law enforcement, as well as FAA
and airline personnel.
Recommendation from Initial Report dated September 9, 1996
Provide regular, comprehensive explosives detection training programs
for foreign, federal, state, and local law enforcement, as well as FAA and
airline personnel. The Commission believes that law enforcement agencies
with expertise in explosives detection can provide valuable training to those
involved in aviation security.
Status
The ATF and FAA are preparing a training course for airport law
enforcement agencies.
The ATF is developing a curriculum on Improvised Explosive Devices. The pilot
program is planned for Spring, 1997. In addition to ongoing explosives training
for ATF personnel, three states and local Advanced Explosives Investigative
Techniques classes are scheduled at the Federal Law Enforcement Training Center
in Glynco, Georgia. Finally, post blast and improvised explosive device
recognition training will be conducted by 198 ATF certified explosive
specialists for State and Local law enforcement personnel throughout the United
States.
3.31. Create a central clearinghouse within government to
provide information on explosives crime.
Recommendation from Initial Report dated September 9, 1996
Create a central clearinghouse within government to provide information
on explosives crime. The Commission recommends that a central
clearinghouse be established to compile and distribute important information
relating to previously encountered explosive devices, both foreign and domestic.
Status
The Secretary of the Treasury has established a national repository at
the ATF.
The Secretary of the Treasury was authorized to establish a national
repository of information on incidents involving arson and the suspected
criminal misuse of explosives. All Federal agencies having information
concerning such incidents report the information to the Secretary. The ATF
National Repository committee, has established a target date of October 1, 1997,
for the implementation of the pilot project, with full implementation by the end
of FY 1998. The system will be designed and constructed in incremental stages
providing varying levels of service as early as April, 1997.
Chapter Four:
Responding to Aviation Disasters
"I am testifying today to give a sense of purpose to the death of my
daughter and the others who lost their lives on TWA flight 800. I believe that
by identifying areas in need of improvement, we can successfully generate a
change in policy and action for the future. We will create a living memorial to
their death."
Aurlie Becker.
The Commission's recommendations included setting a goal of reducing the rate
of fatal accidents by a factor of five over the next ten years, and outlined a
course of action that would help achieve that goal. Additionally, the Commission
has recommended specific steps to reduce the threat of terrorism against
commercial aircraft. However, it must be recognized that, in spite of the
strongest efforts of all involved, disasters may still occur. While government
and industry must do everything possible to prevent them, they must also be
prepared to respond quickly and compassionately when one does take place. The
tragedy of losing a loved one in a plane crash can be cruelly and needlessly
compounded by an uncoordinated, ineffective, or uninformed response to family
members.
The infrequency of commercial aviation accidents has complicated the response
to such disasters. For example, when TWA Flight 800 crashed on July 17, 1996, it
had been over twenty years since that airline's last fatal accident. Most
crashes simply overwhelm state and local response teams, and take a tremendous
toll on airline employees, who must immediately begin addressing the concerns of
family members at the same time that they are coping with the loss of their own
colleagues.
Responding to the frustrations and complaints of family members over the
treatment they received after accidents, President Clinton signed an executive
memorandum giving the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) the
responsibility for coordinating federal services to families after aviation
disasters. Congress subsequently passed legislation further expanding and
clarifying the NTSB's new responsibilities.
Since its creation in 1967, the NTSB is the one entity that has been on the
site of every transportation disaster. The Commission applauds the designation
of the NTSB as the coordinating agency after aviation disasters, and commends
the agency for its diligence in carrying out its new responsibilities.
Recommendations
4.1. The National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB)
should finalize by April, 1997, its coordinated federal response plan to
aviation disasters, and Congress should provide the NTSB with increased funding
to address its new responsibilities.
The NTSB has developed an interim plan for a coordinated federal response to
aviation disasters, which should be finalized as quickly as possible. That
interim plan was put to the test in two recent disasters involving commuter
aircraft, and resulted in clear improvements in service. The Commission commends
the work of the NTSB and believes that only through a coordinated effort, and
establishment of a standard protocol, can effective support be provided to local
governments and airlines to meet the needs of family members. The Commission
recommends that Congress provide such additional funds necessary to allow the
NTSB to carry out the new responsibilities described in the Aviation Disaster
Family Assistance Act of 1996.
4.2. The Department of Transportation should coordinate
the development of plans for responding to aviation disasters involving
civilians on government aircraft.
The families of civilians killed while traveling on government aircraft face
the same traumas and challenges as those whose loved ones were killed on
commercial flights. However, the response to such disasters is covered under
different laws and procedures. Those differences, and a clear statement
regarding their rights and benefits in the event of an aviation disaster, should
be provided to passengers on government aircraft prior to boarding. The
Commission believes that it is essential that those families receive assistance
comparable to that provided after commercial disasters through the enhanced role
of the NTSB. The Commission urges the DOT to work with the NTSB, DoD, other
agencies, and family members to develop plans to accomplish that goal by
September 1997 and to evaluate the need to revise existing laws and regulations
governing the rights and benefits of civilians on government aircraft.
4.3. The Department of Transportation and the NTSB should implement key
provisions of the Aviation Disaster Family Assistance Act of 1996 by March 31,
1997.
This Act authorized the formation of a task force to study the need for
modifications to laws or regulations that would result in improvements to the
treatment of family members of victims of aviation disasters. This task force
will consider, among other things, issues relating to treatment of families by
the media and legal community. Additionally, the Commission urges the task force
to consider the development of uniform guidelines for notification, autopsies
and DNA testing and other issues raised by family members, including rights and
treatment of foreign citizens and non-traditional families, securing crash
sites, availability of cockpit voice recorder transcripts, and the composition
of accident investigation teams. The Commission expects that establishment of
the task force will be one of the first priorities for the new Secretary of
Transportation, and that it will be accomplished without delay.
In November 1996, the Chairman of the NTSB and the Secretary of
Transportation (DOT) sent a joint letter to airlines to underscore the
importance of this Act and to advise on the responsibilities of airlines to
formulate disaster response plans. Those plans are due to the DOT and the NTSB
by early April 1997.
In addition, the NTSB should work with the State Department through Memoranda
of Understanding or other mechanisms to provide direct services to the families
of U.S. citizens who are victims of disasters on U.S. carriers abroad.
4.4. The United States Government should ensure that family members of
victims of international aviation disasters receive just compensation and
equitable treatment through the application of federal laws and international
treaties.
Certain statutes and international treaties, established over 50 years ago,
historically have not provided equitable treatment for families of passengers
involved in international aviation disasters. Specifically, the Death on the
High Seas Act of 1920 (Act) and the Warsaw Convention of 1929 (Convention),
although designed to aid families of victims of maritime and aviation disasters,
have inhibited the ability of family members of international aviation disasters
from obtaining fair compensation. A recent agreement by U.S. airlines waived the
liability of the Warsaw Convention. However, the Death on the High Seas Act
still limits recoveries available after certain aviation disasters.
Congress passed the Justice for Victims of Terrorism Act of 1996 as a first
step to remedy this situation. The Commission urges the Administration and the
Congress to take additional steps necessary to ensure fairer and more equitable
treatment of families of victims of international aviation disasters, including
the establishment of an advisory board, pursuant to section 211 of the Aviation
Security Improvement Act of 1990, to develop a plan for equitable compensation
of victims of aviation disasters.
4.5 Provisions should be made to ensure the availability of funding for
extraordinary costs associated with accident response.
The NTSB and other federal, state, and local government agencies can incur
significant costs in the course of an accident response. Those costs cannot be
anticipated nor budgeted for in advance, and their recovery has been made on an
ad hoc basis, further complicating an already difficult situation. The
Commission urges the Administration and Congress to address this issue, through
the consideration of measures such as requirements for increased insurance
coverage for companies involved in air transportation.
4.6. Federal agencies should establish peer support programs to assist
rescue, investigative, law enforcement, counseling and other personnel involved
in aviation disaster response.
The men and women who respond on the scene of aviation disasters can suffer
from considerable trauma and emotional impact. Specially trained peer support
counselors, who are themselves investigators who have had similar experiences,
should be dispatched to the scene of a disaster to help those involved in the
response effort. The Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms (ATF), because of
its frequent investigations of arson and bombings, has developed such a program
for its agents. The NTSB, the FAA, and other agencies should work with the ATF
to develop programs for their personnel within existing budgets.
Conclusions
The Commission believes that each of its recommendations is achievable. But,
the Commission has no authority to implement its recommendations. That
responsibility lies with government and industry. Many of the proposals will
require additional funding. Some of them will require legislation. Each of them
requires sustained attention. We now urge the President to make these
recommendations his own. We urge Congress to provide the necessary legislation
and funding. We urge the incoming leadership of the DOT and the FAA to make
fulfillment of these recommendations a cornerstone of their work. We urge the
commercial aviation industry to take up th | 